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 The digital duplication proposed by computer–mediated 
technologies (CMT) cultivates a new aesthetics of reproduction as it serves 
the need for persistence of the object, thus, ensuring its ephemeral presence. 
The digital object, in turn, appears not to be present to us immediately, but 
through its digital model. Nevertheless, the question to pose is whether the 
reality of the object, not in its immediacy, but in the perspective of its 
perpetuation in time ultimately leads to its replacement by an artificial 
integrity that challenges the risks of actual existence. A possible answer 
could be that the denaturalization of the object present to our consciousness 
denies its right to exist in the corruptible historical time in order to conquer 
digital oblivion. 
 




 Through digital–mediated technologies we assert a process that could 
be designated as planned operation of duplication which could lead to the 
rupture of the object’s uniqueness. The receiver of the digital object is 
involved, more or less consciously, in a disembodied reality, in 
‘cyberphysically digital life–forms as reconfigured through computer 
software systems’ (cited in Tomas, 1991: 33). Furthermore, the transfer of a 
real object into digital space introduces a new spatial distribution, but also an 
incision in the order of linear time. The duplication of the real object by its 
digital double implicates the contraction of linear time, the constriction of its 
lived presence, and last, but not least, the denial of its uniqueness. What is 
thus achieved is the restoration of the ‘visually correct’, which is most often 
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related to the restoration of a deficiency in order for the object to recover its 
integrity. What is also involved in these processes is the replacement of the 
object’s sensible perception by a software in order for the object to gain an 
expanded geography, in other words, its duplication through digital media, 
which bears all the signs of an absence. The issue we will also address as to 
the status of the virtual, disembodied object is whether it is the real or the 
virtual object that is closer to the condition of human vulnerability and risk. 
In our paper we will focus on the relationship between real and digital–
mediated objects on the basis of the intertwining of presence and 
embodiment as existential condition of the cultural self, on one hand, and 
disembodiment as a unique characteristic of virtual presence, on the other. It 
is in this light that an archaeological object is not a disembodied object, but 
an integral ‘thing’ that encompasses a tangible immediacy, thus constituting 
the dynamic component of a cultural totality. Consequently, our aim will be 
to study the archeological object as a ‘being–in–the–world’, necessitating a 
condition of embodiment which differentiates it from its digital duplication. 
 
The archaeological object and the life–world 
In today’s globalized environment a transformation has occurred: ‘the 
real has been confused with the directly accessible’ (cited in Serres, 2001: 
213). The object’s disengagement from its unique place in the world has 
made possible its endless reconstruction, as it now belongs to endless places 
which are not real but virtual. Thus, it becomes integrated into a global 
space, finding itself away from its birthplace (Ess, 2005: 161–164). Being 
detached from the state of actual presence virtual object is subject to an 
infinite ‘diaspora’, as it no longer possesses the identifiable features or the 
elaborative interrelations with an artistic center, a workshop or a commercial 
route which make it ‘what it is’. 
Current technological innovation has introduced the substitution of 
reality, as real objects are taken over by virtual objects, that is, objects 
reduced to mono–sensory perceptions and detached from their life–world 
[Our use of the term life–world (Lebenswelt) is directly inspired by the 
phenomenological analyses of Edmund Husserl (Held, 2003: 32–62; Russell, 
2007: 194–197)] . However, digital technologies that create virtual objects 
focus on making these both attainable and attractive to a large number of 
people. They aim primarily to convince us that they can operate on a global 
scale by achieving an artificial universalisation. The success of virtual reality 
technologies lies in what Slavoj Žižek (2003: 96) identifies as the emergence 
of a simulated reality, from which the essence of things is absent (Bryant, 
2011: 123–134). Let us take for instance the world we live in, our 
relationship with the past and archaeological objects, but also our daily 
existence: we have built a technologically mediated reality through which we 




can finally experience a ‘real’ reality. But it is precisely this simulated reality 
that we recognize as reality instead of reality itself.  
Virtual reality shows great interest in beautifying the object: it 
mimics its form but is unable to reproduce the object’s life–world or ‘human 
world–life’ (Husserl, 1970: § 43, 155–157; Moran, 2012: 178–217). The 
illusionary appeal of a supposed copy of a ‘real’ archaeological object may 
sound stimulating but technologically mediated simulations can never 
replace or even reproduce the elaborative cultural ties that make the object’s 
uniqueness as such. The archaeological object, in its natural habitat, is tied to 
its very own life–world. In addition, its distinct local and general differences 
are rooted in its origin. The object is intertwined with its life–world and it is 
through its life–worldly existence that it is constantly updated in the human 
conscience through time. 
Whatever is reproduced in the realm of the virtual disrupts actual 
presence (Baudrillard, 1983: 128–129) since virtual reality aspires to reverse 
the natural process of decay and oblivion by establishing a special kind of 
cumulative memory through a constant flow of information. Virtual reality 
technologies undertake the task of replacing oral memory, whereas in the 
course of human evolution a series of mediums (i.e. clay, stone, leather, 
papyrus, paper) held the burden of accumulating the experiences of the past. 
They attempt to liberate us from the overcharge of the objectified memory, 
which real objects bear with them. Nevertheless, the ability to recall a 
memory is the result of a complex process that enabled mankind to identify 
archaeological objects as organic parts of a collective memory. This 
collectively constituted memory allows human mind to question and create. 
More importantly, the real object is the result of an elaborate 
experience within a wider life–world. Matter and form go beyond their 
tangible nature, as they establish symbolically a whole new institution inside 
the life–world (Baudrillard, 1968: 129–131). Its archaeological object is 
unique, as it is shaped through a process of cultural embodiment. 
Additionally, the object itself is directly linked to a variety of features, such 
as its ingredients, materials or compositions, its form and shape, color, 
design, weight, size as well as its state of preservation. It outlines the 
boundaries and exclusion zones that define the regions within the life–world. 
The physical qualities that make up an object’s appearance, once historically 
defined, are embedded into a context that allows us to distinguish one object 
from another, thus making it a reference object. Consequently, the 
archaeological object does not operate independently from the life–world it 
belongs to. It serves a proof that allows us to simultaneously distinguish and 
condense evidence. The object stems from a differentiation process which 
reminds us of the multitude of diverse embodied relations which have made 
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it up (Bourdieu, 1990; Geertz, 1993). For this reason the archaeological 
object is unique in its state of presence. 
When shaped as a cultural construct, the real object essentially enters 
the life–world through the subject’s multi–sensory experience. In contrast, 
because of its reduced presence, the virtual archaeological object leads to the 
deprivation of the situated and embodied experience. When the 
archaeological object is disjointed from its life–world, it no longer has any 
limits. However, limits have an important function. They actually help us to 
determine the object’s identity in addition to its virtual replication, even if 
illusory, dematerialized or disembodied. The real object, therefore, 
participates in a transferable embodiment process, which can be designated 
in terms of ‘embodied situated knowledge’ (Ihde, 2002: 69–75). Could the 
virtual archaeological object succeed in replacing the real object with the 
same terms and conditions as the real object? When virtual replication takes 
hold, it contributes to the object’s restructuring, as all possible meanings 
which emerge from its unique creation and its multiple uses are lost. As a 
result the object is transformed into a mere representation. Thus, it can no 
longer produce or recreate meanings, since the object’s virtual replication 
stems from an impaired life–world turned into digital imaging or into what 
Don Ihde describes the ‘imaginative invention of the absent programmer’ 
(cited in Ihde, 2002: 81). 
 
Archaeological object’s embodied presence 
A virtually replicated archaeological object has necessarily 
undergone a process of simplification and dematerialization. At the same 
time, a virtually created object seems to support the ideal of immunity, 
whereas the real archaeological object is always subject to decay. 
Nevertheless, the principal condition of an archaeological object’s embodied 
situated presence is not immunity or versatility but uniqueness and finitude. 
One could argue that the real archaeological object exists as a unique entity, 
whereas its virtual replication holds the potential for a multitude of options 
(Ihde, 2002: 85). But in any case, virtual replication cannot under any 
circumstances reproduce tangible interactions among the object and its 
environing world (Ihde, 2002: 87). Therefore, an object’s virtual 
representation allows for a reduced perception which is meant to replace the 
multi–sensory perception of the real object. To compensate for the loss of the 
real presence, the virtual object usually operates under conditions of 
enhanced visibility or audibility. However, for the virtual boundary of the 
non–perishable to be replaced by an enhanced visibility or audibility, it 
requires ‘a correction and a discipline upon the senses’ (cited in Shapin and 
Schaffer, 2011: 36–37). In reality, the shift toward a virtual environment is 
meant to substitute for any activity of recall and repetition. 




Only the conditions that ensure our embeddedness into a life–world 
can give meaning to our experience of the past. Our existence is culturally 
mediated, whereas cultural contexts are determined symbolic signifiers 
which provide the self with a framework, thus defining its cultural 
constitution. So, within ‘real’ space and time a boundary determines the 
difference between the same and the other, the real and the imagined, the 
local and the global. Moreover, a privileged feature in an object’s conception 
and use is the active involvement of the human subject. In fact, an object 
belongs to the field of everyday human experience. Consequently, when the 
object is disconnected from everyday human experience, it is also 
disengaged from all subjective experience. 
Entry into virtual reality applies to imaginary objects as opposed to 
real ones and so the perceptual field of objects is modified. This 
transformation process ruptures the boundaries of the tangible self, but also 
affects the way in which the self situates himself in the world. In contrast to 
the embodied perception of the real object, in the new virtual environment, 
meaning is conferred to the self based on multiple technological capabilities. 
This is even more important because the relationship between the self and 
technology has always been twofold: ‘Insofar as I use or employ a 
technology, I am used by and employed by that technology as well’ (cited in 
Ihde, 2002: 137). In reality, the virtual object has radically modified the 
human subject’s sense of finitude and risk. On the one hand, a real object 
possesses integrity, which is no other than the life–world it belongs to. But 
also, the subject who created or used the object belongs to the same life–
world. Thus, upon closer look, the real object’s presence reveals the 
intentions of its maker, as well as the life–world within which the object’s 
creation was accomplished. On the other hand, the virtual object lacks the 
experiential density proper to real objects. Virtual reality seeks to exceed the 
limits of the finite, natural and cultural, self thanks to its idealizing position. 
It seems to enable us to overcome the ravages of time and erase any 
imperfections. Such is the case of the idealized virtual body that acts as a 
compensatory mechanism for whatever imperfections may exist. However, 
virtual reality’s claim to substitute for the real object operates simultaneously 
in the opposite direction, one that leads toward the loss of the archaeological 
object’s unity and integrity. Virtual reality detracts the object from 
complying with the terms of its cultural presence under two conditions. The 
first condition has to do with the creator’s integration in his object, whereas 
the second one has to do with the time invested in creating the object granted 
that the creation harnesses the very nature of the object. The archaeological 
object’s uniqueness is directly linked to its creator’s long–term relationship 
with learning processes and skills which are part of its life–world. Moreover, 
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the object substitutes for past relationships, because it happens to belong to a 
community (Ess, 2005: 175–176). 
In reality, disconnecting from the real world through virtual reality 
technologies implies opening the door to a state that is foreign to the 
embodied self and its practices. Prior to virtual replication, if we were to list 
the values that are integrated in a real object we’ll notice that its relationship 
to nature is not the only thing at stake. The object becomes the thing that is 
transformed into a material for a whole community (Ihde, 2002: 37–40). This 
material touches on all aspects of the life–world including the constraints and 
challenges that the material itself imposed on its creator through its 
processing and use. The real object is a documented expression of allegiance 
to a pre–formulated order, for which embodiment is the most crucial factor. 
The virtual disembodied object certainly produces the denial of nature, thus, 
allowing a special kind of freedom and autonomy, as the object is 
determined independently from the limitations – ethnic, gendered and other – 
of the embodied self.  
Freedom and autonomy are inevitably linked to a challenge posed to 
actual presence and its coercions. The real object would be used, modified or 
destroyed, whereas in virtual reality the object exists independently of its 
creator’s and users’ intentionality. The real object carries with it all the 
inherited knowledge gained from its creator’s and users’ lived experiences, 
whereas the  virtual disembodied object tends to surpass the weaknesses of 
the past that continue to exist in the real object as accumulated traces of 
memory. The most significant consequence of virtual disembodiment is 
demonstrated in the case where the material (i.e. object) must be withdrawn 
from the virtual space, regardless if shaped by a cultural practice. The object 
is no longer simply a finalized product produced at a particular time and 
place. It becomes a one–dimensional reduced image or, in the best of cases, a 
three–dimensional digital reproduction, whereas, the real object is the 
product of a complex creative process. Contrary to this, the virtual object can 
only be identified to a partial representation. Due to its inability to exist in a 
state of actual presence and among living bodies, virtual reality is unable to 
reconstruct the whole of the ontological, cognitive and moral–practical 
dimensions that make up our experience of the life–world. It holds true, 
however, that virtual reality provides various forms of non–physical contact, 
which eliminate all the contexts of physical geography, introducing a 
spatial–temporal discontinuity. To remove the object’s connection with its 
life–world has heavy consequences, but this is the way the human subject 
has always escaped to the imaginary. Additionally, when an archaeological 
objects is embedded in a life–world, a state of reciprocity is initiated, 
manifested in lived experiences, whereas in the case of virtual object no such 
circumstances exist. 




The ‘Openness’ of the archaeological object to the world and its reality 
as a thing 
Prior to becoming a virtual object, thus, being detached from its life–
world, the archaeological object witnesses the effort of combining contents 
and meanings which confirm it’s identity with itself and the world it belongs 
to. In fact, the openness of the archaeological object to its life–world is far 
more important than its use for practical purposes or knowledge acquisition, 
as it is the outcome of man’s mediation with nature at a specific point in 
time. Its ‘openness’ to the world (Heidegger, 2002: 5, 14, 30, 35–37; 
Feenberg, 2006: 193–199) implies not only its creator’s intentionality, but a 
self–discovery full of meaning symbolically shaped. In contrast, the 
virtualization of the archaeological object deprives it of its ‘openness” to the 
world. The virtual object becomes ‘unworlded’ (entweltlicht). This process is 
accompanied by several shortcomings, the most serious being the inability 
for the virtual to recreate the culturally coherent complex of lived 
experiences and symbolic structures that allow a past life–world to be 
genuinely reactivated. 
According to Michel Serres the object’s virtual substitution by a one–
dimensional or even three–dimensional object can certainly succeed in 
replicating several of its fundamental characteristics (Serres, 2001: 186–188, 
258–259, 272–273). However, the archaeological object’s prior associations 
with a life–world are deleted, because these have been acquired through 
specific practices and symbolic relations. The virtual object is produced 
outside any specific practice or symbolic interaction, even if it is generated 
by a three–dimensional or even multi–dimensional digital process (Csordas, 
1999: 145–151). It does not participate in any amount to the state of 
uncertainty and risk which emerges along with lived experiences within an 
actual life–world. Furthermore, it does not recall the collective experiences 
of perishability and finitude, as it is impossible to reconstruct the complex 
internal structure and consistency of the life–world in which it emerged.  
The virtual object is a power tool because of its ability to substitute 
the perishable with the non–perishable, to prolong life, to preserve memory, 
last but not least to dismiss human mortality. Contrary to the actual reality, 
which is often burdened with postponements and delays, the benefit of 
replication is that it removes the uncertainty of perishability and decay. 
Instead of this, what is established is the illusion of exceeding the spatio–
temporal limits. Within virtual reality we don’t currently exist as virtual 
beings, but through a digital medium that constantly removes all burden 
associated to embodied presence. But this comes along with the loss of the 
wealth of symbolizations of the past (Bourdieu, 1990). Where the wealth of 
symbolic interactions once existed, a new but permanent form of 
accumulation through information acquisition is now prevails. This 
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cumulative build up certainly aspires to preserve a certain situation. 
Following our entrance into the course of history we’ve built the need to 
preserve surpluses. These surpluses are ultimately the only means for 
controlling the survival and reproduction of structures of dominance and 
subordination. In fact, the virtual object offers the possibility of maximizing 
of results and accumulation of information. It may, however, correspond to a 
fake situation based on the mastery of an artifice. What lies behind it is the 
drive to dominate the past, so characteristic of the modern times. The 
unfamiliarity of the ‘non–places’ (Augé, 1995) that the virtual object has 
introduced, while it depreciates real time and space, it brings to light a new 
reality. As opposed to the perishable real object, virtual reality technologies 
allow the representational reconstruction of an object that is favorable to any 
design and redesign. The only way–out to the ‘heroic virtual’ is to preserve 
the embodied human existence and its historical rootedness as well as the 
life–world that sustains both. 
The sheer enforcement to preserve objects of the past in an inventory 
and turn them into representational objects was in fact conceived as a 
counterweight to human mortality. By reducing actual objects to 
representational objects, modernity has brought to an end its project to 
objectify nature. Consequently, in contrast the ‘reality’ of a thing, in our case 
of an archaeological object, should be understood as a whole of life–worldly 
relations and interactions. Such interactions create a context that aims to 
ensure the reproduction of a symbolically instituted life–world. The real 
object is full embodied and perceived through multi–sensory experiences. It 
also involves a set of cultural constants, which are irreducible to mere 
representation, even of the most sophisticated kind. In contrast, the virtual 
object possesses no life–world, as its decisive feature is no other than the loss 
of actual presence. Therefore, our experience of the past can not be reduced 
to processes of virtualization of the archaeological objects, which deprive the 
latter of their embeddedness into past life–worlds. 
The zealots of virtual reality argue that simulated reality is not 
deprived of qualities such as reciprocity and interaction (Forte, 2008: 91–
106; Forte, 2010; Gillings, 2005). However, these latter presuppose the 
existence of a life–world, as they can never be disembedded or 
decontextualized in some way. Simulated environments, even in its more 
sophisticated forms, cannot be interactive in a specific reductive way which 
is compatible with their artificiality. In other worlds, simulation reinforces 
the archaeological object’s artificial reproductions and does not in any way 
compensate for the loss of its life–world, as the virtual is not a duplicated or 
improved version of the real, but what is utterly different from it (Miller and 
Richards, 1995). In fact, a virtual archaeological objet is more of a ‘non–
object’ than an enhanced object, and this is something that technological 




advancements, such as cyberspace (Bukatman, 2000: 100–101) archaeology, 
which claim to enrich simulation processes, inevitably fails to see. 
We find ourselves at a point in human history where research on the 
human being’s appearance on Earth is gradually replaced with research on 
the Earth’s appearance in human history. For this reason the current polluted 
environment, which often predicts ecological destruction, must adopt a new 
contract – a natural contract –, which according to Michel Serres should 
replace the modern social contract (Serres, 2001: 183–185; Jeleniewski 
Seidler, 1998: 23–25). Its aim would be to remove the surplus from the 
virtual’s inflicted power so that we don’t return to a denial state where 
nature’s natural resources are depleted (reversed surplus). 
Rapid technological development has lead to the creation of a global 
community. This new reality possesses all the characteristics of a global 
environment (see, for instance, the evolution of media communication), and, 
because of its intense development, it has established a homogeneous space. 
In this light, topography is no longer relevant (Serres, 2001: 259–260). In 
reality, the virtual has the comparative advantage of replacing the real object 
with an encoded software (Nayar, 2004: 228–229). It is this change of great 
magnitude which has led to the substitution of the local by the ‘glocal’. The 
real object exists in constant fear of losing its integrity or of suffering from 
irreparable damage, but this threatening battle against the possibility for 
irrevocable damage and destruction is removed from the virtual field. 
Everything that is created under the threat of being endangered in the first 
case, is granted ever–lasting presence in the second (Heim, 1993: 134–137). 
Therefore, the real–virtual bipolarity represents the bipolarity of the actually 
present, thus susceptibility to decay, on the one hand, and the everlasting 
presence that comes with simulation, on the other. Nevertheless, the virtual 
object is unable to have any relationship to the life–world. 
Computer–mediated technologies (CMT) can be designated as 
intrusive, not embracing technological patterns, as they tend to intrude into 
past life–worlds, thus imposing themselves upon them. If the issue is to 
comprehend the past this is certainly not the best or the most valid way of 
doing so, because to some extend we transfer today’s needs, wants, 
aspirations, but also today’s technological capacities, into something totally 
other. Even in their most complex responsive or interactive versions 




Firstly, virtual embodiment is a contested idea. Embodiment has to 
do with a specific life–world. I doubt that even a fully immersive 
environment can be identified to life–world, or at least this is something to 
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be proved. Secondly, the cognitive background and the state of validity in 
interpretation through simulation processes should be questioned as such. In 
my opinion virtual or cyber archaeology take for granted what 
archaeologists, epistemologically speaking, should prove. Of course, this is 
an interdisciplinary matter. Nevertheless, those are questions which should 
be taken seriously when our objective is the comprehension of the past.  
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